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and Peace Talks in Colombia
Introduction
The escalation of the Colombian con-
flict over the past few years has placed a
considerable burden on the Colombian pri-
vate sector. This is revealed by climbing
rates of capital flight, the destruction of
infrastructure such as energy and commu-
nication towers and roads, the kidnappings
and extortion of business executives, and
the growing tax burden to support the war
effort. As a result, more business members
today realize that the Colombian conflict
scares away foreign investors and prevents
domestic capital from being used produc-
tively. While Colombia has been able to
maintain levels of economic growth simi-
lar or higher than the Latin American aver-
age despite its internal troubles, for many
business people the long standing
Colombian conflict affects their financial
results and shapes their calculations and
strategies. For business, conflict has turned
into a liability affecting the country’s com-
petitiveness in the region and worldwide.
In fact, public order (or better, the lack
thereof) consistently ranks among the most
important problems according to business
surveys, as does the widespread perception
that only a better security climate will
bring improved conditions for investment.
This becomes especially compelling in
light of academic and government estima-
tions that–in the absence of conflict–the
Colombian GDP would grow at an addi-
tional 2 percent a year.
Colombian business’ concern with
questions related to its economic viability
and stability in a violent context are pro-
viding an important stimulus to growing
business participation in seeking a peace-
ful solution to the Colombian conflict. The
rationale underlying recent business
peacebuilding activity is simple, as stated
by one Colombian executive: “Peace is
better business”. The assertion seems jus-
tified. Due to the general climate of inse-
curity companies are spending between 4
and 6 percent of their budgets on protec-
tion of their staff, equipment, and opera-
tions. In addition, Colombia has the high-
est kidnapping rate in the world. Business
people are preferred targets: According to
the NGO País Libre, of the more than
3,000 people kidnapped each year since
1998, 15 percent are linked to the business
community. In addition, the private sector
faces other types of extortion. Especially
in rural areas, the guerrilla’s and paramili-
taries’ practice of charging regular fees to
landowners is a common phenomenon. 
Business has also been pressed hard
for resources from government. Since the
mid 1990s, it has paid more than USD 900
million in different forms of security taxes
and bonds. Most recently, upon entering
office, president Álvaro Uribe increased
the tax burden to support the war effort (or
provide “democratic security”, as desig-
nated in the budget) against the Colombian
insurgency by implementing a tax of 1.2
percent on liquid net assets in the case of
working capitals of USD 60,000 or higher.
The category fits only 400,000 tax payers
but the perspective of having to reach deep
into their pockets in order to contribute to
the re-establishment of order and security
matters to business overall.
As costs associated with conflict are
exceeding business’ willingness to pay,
business has begun to consider the conve-
nience of investing in peace or supporting
a negotiated solution to conflict. On the
one hand, different business-led peace ini-
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tiatives at the regional and local levels
have launched projects aimed at altering
local production of goods motivated by the
belief that the development of conflict-rid-
den areas will generate the conditions for
durable peace. On the other hand, business
involvement in peace negotiations has also
been on the rise. Although formal talks
between the government and the Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias (FARC) broke
down in February 2002 and contacts
between the government and the Ejército
de Liberación Nacional (ELN) are stagnat-
ing, both processes witnessed an unprece-
dented interest and participation by busi-
ness executives and association leaders
alike. 
This document will highlight some of
the characteristics of business participa-
tion in the Colombian peace talks. As will
be shown, “business” is too diffuse a cate-
gory to grasp the divisions and currents
within the Colombian private sector faced
with peace negotiations. Organizational
differences in political preferences and
capacity to influence affect business’
impact on efforts to build peace. In addi-
tion, some business participation has
occurred in the context of civil society
activity, where business associations have
come to play leading roles. Other business
activity relevant to the likelihood of a
negotiated end to conflict in Colombia
sets it distinctly apart from this category. 
Business and peace talks in Colombia
Business is not a newcomer to the tur-
bulent history of Colombian peace negotia-
tions. Ever since the mid 1980s, when pres-
ident Belisario Betancur launched the first
serious round of talks with the Colombian
rebel movements, business associations
have influenced peace strategy and have
occupied important positions in the govern-
ment negotiating team. However, this par-
ticipation did not yet reflect a widespread
concern with conflict or peace on behalf of
the whole Colombian private sector. At the
time, conflict levels were still low compared
to current standards and Colombian soci-
ety’s attention was more concerned with the
growing drug trade and its impact on
domestic criminality. As recalled by a for-
mer association president, “the private sec-
tor in the 1980s was either skeptical or
clearly opposed to peace negotiations”.
A surge in conflict intensity beginning
in the mid 1990s brought a qualitative
change in business preoccupation with
questions of peace. Better remembered by
the corruption and drug scandal that
clouded his administration, the govern-
ment of Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) con-
fronted extensive civil society opposition,
in which business associations took on a
leading role. Despite widespread resis-
tance, Samper was able to finish his con-
stitutional mandate, but the momentum
gained by civil society organizations
served to nurture the transformation of
political opposition into massive mobi-
lization to seek a negotiated end to the
Colombian conflict. In this sense, while
the government itself was too busy fend-
ing off opposition to pursue any meaning-
ful peace strategy, civil society organiza-
tions–primarily business–took on a lead-
ing role.
An important result of this fervor was
the movement surrounding the Citizen
Mandate for Peace, Life, and Freedom, a
civil society initiative against conflict,
which, in a nationwide poll on 26 October,
1997, collected 10 million votes in an
informal voting process. Although of no
more than symbolic value, the poll sig-
naled an increasing determination on
behalf of civil society organizations to
confront armed actors of all ideological
directions with a decisive “no more”. 
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Participation in the Citizen Mandate
movement became the seed of business
participation in the peace processes of the
following years. Encouraged by the suc-
cess of the Citizen Mandate movement,
business associations led efforts to resume
contacts with guerrilla groups in search of
a negotiated solution to the Colombian
conflict. Beginning in 1998, associations
established contacts with imprisoned lead-
ers of the National Liberation Army (ELN
for its Spanish abbreviation), the second
largest leftist rebel group in Colombia.
Several preparatory meetings in Germany
led to a first large congregation of Colom-
bian civil society and ELN representatives
in Mainz, in June 1998. Results of the
meeting were summarized a month later
in the Accord of Heaven’s Gate (in refer-
ence to the monastery which hosted the
meeting), basically the commitment to
seek a solution to the Colombian crisis.
The accord, which catalyzed the begin-
ning of a formal peace process with the
ELN, was signed by representatives of a
wide range of business associations,
including small- and medium-sized com-
panies, retailers, chambers of commerce,
industry, and cattle ranchers. 
While the peace process with the ELN
was characterized by the dominant role–as
players and facilitators–of business asso-
ciations within the larger context of civil
society, the arrival of Andrés Pastrana in
the presidential palace in August 1998
marked a turn in the presence of business
in peace negotiations. Pastrana’s high
impact peace publicity and his boldness in
approaching FARC leaders spread opti-
mism among the general public and earned
him the Presidency. In particular, he
enjoyed full support among the private
sector, which held high expectations as to
his ability of reaching a negotiated solu-
tion. In fact, his electoral victory caused a
surge in favorable perceptions regarding
sociopolitical conditions for investment,
as measured by a tri-monthly business
survey. 
These high expectations explain some
of the manifestations of business enthusi-
asm in the months preceding and follow-
ing Pastrana’s victory. For example, the
cattle ranchers’ association–representing
one of the hardest hit sectors of the econo-
my–proposed to donate land as a contribu-
tion to abating conflict among owners and
peasants on the countryside. More specif-
ic was business’ commitment to support
“peace bonds”, a forced investment to col-
lect revenues for social investment as part
of the private sector’s contribution to Plan
Colombia, the largely U.S.-financed pro-
gram to eradicate drugs and associated
criminality in Colombia. In addition,
numerous workshops, and other public
events saw business people refer to the
importance of a peaceful solution to con-
flict and to the private sector’s responsi-
bility in peacebuilding. 
In terms of actual participation in
talks, however, Pastrana privileged the
active but low-profile involvement of
prominent business executives–instead of
business association leaders–in his negoti-
ation team. In addition, he was more akin
to bringing an end to the confrontation
with the larger and militarily stronger
FARC, putting the process with the ELN
on the backburner. Both circumstances
contributed to relegating civil society–as
well as business associations–to a sec-
ondary role. 
As a result, representatives of “real”
business–or representatives of the largest
companies and conglomerates who are
actually involved in investment deci-
sions–became particularly active during
the Pastrana-led negotiations. This illus-
trates an important split within the Colom-
bian business community’s position faced
with negotiations. Whereas business asso-
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ciation leaders represent sectoral interests
in the political process, Pastrana preferred
to include genuine capitalists, especially
the owners of some of the largest compa-
nies, in the discussion of his peace strate-
gy. For many, this was the right way to
include business in peace talks, because
the sustainability of an eventual peace
accord will more crucially depend on
actual owners’ willingness to pay some of
the burdens of peace than on the negotiat-
ing capacity and political visibility of
association leaders, who lack economic
decision-making power. However, Pas-
trana’s decision also undermined associa-
tions, which are less influential in terms of
shaping and signalling the private sector’s
actual readiness to commit to peace but
perhaps more legitimate as members of
the larger civil society network.
Beginning in April 2000 business
enthusiasm and hope for a peaceful solu-
tion to the Colombian conflict began to
fade. That month, FARC launched “Law
002”, which charged asset holders of more
than USD 1 million up to 10 percent of
their assets, in exchange for exemption
from attacks. Resistance to pay effectively
prevented distribution of goods of Colom-
bian companies in 100 municipalities
nation-wide, illustrating FARC was seri-
ous about its revenue-collecting tool.
More importantly, Law 002 showed that
peace talks with FARC would not be an
easy bargain. In addition, it confronted
business, especially in rural areas, with
the prospect of a deterioration of the con-
flict, hinting at the likelihood of increased
costs of production and distribution. 
Fears were confirmed by events
throughout that year. In early 2000, ELN
kidnapped over one hundred parishioners
at a religious service and over fifty guests
at an upscale restaurant in the city of Cali,
effectively breaking their promise to spare
civilians from attacks. Later, ELN abduct-
ed an airplane with all its occupants.
FARC put business patience to the test
when it kidnapped the industry associa-
tion’s president’s daughter. In addition,
accusations that FARC was using a demil-
itarized zone–designated specifically for
conducting peace talks–to hide captives
and to grow coca plants made it difficult
for the government to defend ongoing
talks.
By the end of 2000 a turning point had
been reached in business disposition
towards negotiations. While a Gallup poll
of 500 executives in March 2000 showed
70 percent to be in favor of negotiations
with the guerrilla, the percentage had
dropped to 11 percent by the end of the
year. Following widespread business
enthusiasm, results of these surveys illus-
trate a return by business to skepticism
regarding the possibility of reaching a
negotiated end to conflict.
An important factor influencing this
transformation from hope to disenchant-
ment was frustration over the fact that par-
ticipation of business executives in the
negotiating team was no guarantee for the
consideration of private sector interests
nor for the application of private sector
principles of strategic planning to the
design of the peace process. On the con-
trary, peace policy-making by the Pastrana
government came under intense criticism
by business for its isolation from the advi-
sory team and widespread improvisation. 
In February 2002, FARC kidnapped
an airplane and its occupants. This per-
ceived act of provocation provided the
government with the final justification to
end peace talks with this group. As at the
beginning of his government, when peace
talks stood at the top of the agenda,
Pastrana enjoyed full business support
when he decided to cancel them. Four
years of an increasing material and human
cost had taken their toll on business enthu-
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siasm for a negotiated solution, and, most
importantly, on expectations that such a
solution would arrive promptly. 
Against this background, Álvaro
Uribe, who promised the reestablishment
of authority and an emphasis on security,
enjoyed widespread support of the
Colombian business community in the
presidential elections of August 2002.
Elected with a wide margin over his rival,
Uribe embodied the promise that a strong
hand approach to conflict would bring
more tangible results than the four preced-
ing years of lingering talks. Desperation
with the costs of conflict and the failure of
Pastrana’s efforts explain why Uribe was
able to gain business support for a harsh
fiscal reform, requiring the private sector
to take on a significant part of the financial
burden in the ongoing offensive against
the guerrillas. In fact, to promote “democ-
ratic security” against the Colombian
insurgency, Uribe implemented a tax of
1.2 percent on liquid net assets. 
Almost a year after Uribe’s coming to
power, the business-government honey-
moon is not over but a more sober mood
has set in. Already there are signs that
President Uribe’s security strategy may
face more obstacles than initially antici-
pated: Kidnappings are diminishing only
slowly while conflict rages on in rural
areas and has expanded into the cities, as
witnessed in February with the bombing
of Club El Nogal, an elite sports and enter-
tainment club. 
Perhaps as a consequence of lagging
results, hints that the government might
transform the exceptional “war bonds”
into permanent taxes have met business
criticism. The spectre of this possibility
has moderated business expectations as to
the real capabilities of the Uribe govern-
ment to emerge victoriously from the war
effort. As when business was first
enchanted and then disillusioned by
Pastrana’s promise of a prompt negotiated
solution, business now appears to have
moved from enchantment to a more cau-
tious position, as it becomes clear that
conflict will last and that its cost will keep
burdening business.
Conclusions
This article has provided a cursory
overview of the Colombian business com-
munity’s evolution faced with the possi-
bility of reaching an end to the Colombian
conflict. It has shown that through the
Pastrana and Uribe administrations the
cost imposed to business by conflict has
increased. As a result, business has under-
gone two opposite processes: enchant-
ment with a negotiated solution to con-
flict under Pastrana and, given frustration
over Pastrana’s strategy, enchantment
with a strong-hand approach promised by
the Uribe administration. As neither of
these approaches is likely to produce an
end to conflict in the near future, the busi-
ness community appears to have shifted
away from both simplistic expectations
and towards a more realistic understand-
ing of the conflict’s complexity. At the
same time, the growing costs it faces are
consolidating the perception that its
livelihood and future chances of econom-
ic success are vitally linked to ending
conflict.
While illustrating general patterns of
the business-peace relationship in
Colombia, the article has also underscored
some important distinctions within the
business community. Most importantly, it
has pointed at organizational differences
in terms of political preferences and
capacities between business associations
and large capital owners. This distinction
is important when considering business’
affiliation with civil society: while associ-
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ations may rightfully claim civil society
status, actual business people, who have
also been active on the peace front and
whose decisions may weigh more heavily
on the chances of sustaining peace in
Colombia, may not. These distinctions
contribute to unpacking the somewhat dif-
fuse category often referred to as private
sector. In drawing these distinctions, the
article hopes to show that the business-
peace relationship is much more compli-
cated than often recognized.
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